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Introduction
Workers differ in ability. Those who are endowed with great intelligence, good health, and ample energy, and those who have had the benefit of a supportive upbringing and a quality education, are potentially more productive in a wide range of activities than others who have been less fortunate along some or all of these dimensions. One of the most important functions of the labor market is to allocate the heterogenous pool of talent to the different sectors of the economy.
In a world of perfect labor contracts (and competitive firms, complete markets, etc.), the allocation of talent would be efficient. A worker of given talents, confronting a range of opportunities to work in different sectors, would choose the job that appealed the most. But the 'invisible hand' would guide these choices. The most talented individuals would be led by market forces to undertake those jobs with the greatest social return to talent. And individuals of similar ability would find incentive to toil together whenever complementarities in the production technology dictated the efficacy of their doing so.
Alas, real world labor contracts are rarely perfect. Imperfections arise from informational asymmetries and the costliness of verifying the contingencies that might appear in a contract. A workers often has better information than prospective employers about the factors that determine his own productivity. When prospective employers do not observe all of the relevant aspects of an applicant's ability, an offer cannot be made fully contingent on ability. A firm might wish, then, to link an employee's compensation to his or her performance. But there are at least two potential problems with this. First, an individual's productivity may be difficult to measure, because the technology may require joint inputs from a number of workers. Then a contract could tie payments only to the performance of his team. Second, even this more limited class of contracts may be restricted, if workers cannot readily observe a firm's output or its profits. Piecework and profit-sharing arrangements break down when workers cannot verify employers' claims about joint production or the resulting profits. Firms may be left with little choice but to pay similar compensation to 1 workers whose talents differ.
If labor contracts cannot finely distinguish between workers, the allocation of talent may be distorted. To break even, a firm must pay a wage commensurate with the average productivity of its work force. But such an offer induces adverse selection.
A uniform contract that suits the average worker will not appeal to one who knows himself to be more productive than average and perceives alternative options that would provide him a greater return on his talent. Firms that are forced to offer uniform contracts will draw disproportionately from the bottom end of the target population of workers (i.e., those with the observable attributes it demands), while the cream of any group of outwardly similar workers will seek activities in which their outputs can be measured or where they themselves retain property rights to the fruits of their labor.
Imperfect employment contracting affects both occupational choice and industry allocation. A talented individual will eschew activities in which individual attribution is difficult and verification of group output is costly. Within an industry, such an individual might prefer specialties that permit measurement of his personal contribution, or, as in the model presented below, occupations that make him the residual claimant on the output produced by a number of workers. And since industries differ in their technologies, the problems posed by imperfect contracting may be more severe in some sectors than in others. In particular, large-scale manufacturing may be at a disadvantage in attracting the most talented individuals as compared to, say, the software, financial or legal sectors, where it may be easier to measure the contributions of individual workers.
In a world of imperfect labor contracts, national differences in the distribution of talent can be an independent source of comparative advantage. Two countries that are otherwise identical may specialize in different activities in a competitive, free-trade equilibrium, if one country has a greater proportion of low-ability workers than the other. Consider, for example, the United States and Japan. It is commonly observed that Japan has a more homogeneous labor force than the United States.
Suppose the average ability of workers in both countries is the same, and that both countries have access to the same production technologies. Let there be two sectors, one (automobiles) in which a worker's productivity cannot easily be monitored and a second (software) in which attribution is more readily achieved. In Section 2, I
show that there will be no trade between these countries if employment contracts can be written that make a worker's pay contingent on his productivity. In other words, differences in the distribution of talent do not generate comparative advantage when perfect contracts are feasible.
1 But suppose that workers' abilities are not observable to firms and that firms' outputs are not verifiable by employees. Then contracts cannot tie pay to performance. In the United States, a moderately talented individual might be disinclined to enter the industry with team production, because average productivity would be dragged down by those with very low ability. In Japan, the same forces are present, but to a lesser extent. An individual with the same moderate talents might be willing to work in a car plant, if the (average) wage paid to all workers in the sector were not too low. In Section 5, I show that, at a given price, a highability worker may have a greater incentive to join the industry in which his own output is measurable in a country with a large share of low-ability workers than in a country with a smaller share of such workers. Such differences in the incentives for occupational choice create an opportunity for trade. In particular, when there is a uniform distribution of talent in each country, the country that has the greater spread of talent exports the products of attributable efforts and imports the goods that are jointly produced.
There are some important consequences of the trade that derives from differences in distributions of talent in the face of imperfect labor contracting. First, such trade causes a deterioration of the income distribution in the country that imports the jointly-produced good. On the margin, an increase in the relative price of software 1 Grossman and Maggi (2000) show that differences in diversity can be a source of international trade even with perfect information or perfect contracts if, for technological reasons, the talents of team workers are are substitutable in some sectors and complementary in others. This is discussed further in Section 5 below.
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induces the most talented workers in the automobile sector to leave that industry and instead produce software. But this degrades the talent pool among those who remain in the import-competing sector, which depresses average productivity and wages there.
Second, trade associated with imperfect labor contracting can exacerbate a preexisting production distortion in the country that imports the good produced by teams. A talented individual choosing between the automobile and software industries does not take into account that his employment would generate external benefits in the former sector, but not in the latter. If he opts to work in the sector with joint production, average productivity there rises and, as we shall see, some of the benefits accrue to individuals besides himself. If he decides to work instead in the sector in which his personal productivity is measurable, the individual captures all of the social returns to his talent. Thus, national income would be augmented by a marginal increase in the number of individuals who choose the industry with team production, starting from the competitive equilibrium. Since trade may encourage further specialization in individualistic production in the country with a more diverse talent pool, it has the potential to reduce national income even as it worsens the distribution of that income. Production subsidies (or tariffs) could reverse these effects, although Pareto improvements are difficult to come by in view of the asymmetries of information that eliminate the possibility of targeted lump-sum compensations.
The remainder of the paper is in six sections. The basic model is developed in Section 2. It has two sectors, one in which output is produced by teams and another in which either individual productivity can be monitored or individuals can work alone. Labor is the sole input to production, but the labor force is heterogeneous. I examine the Walrasian equilibrium with perfect labor contracts, which then serves as a benchmark for what follows. In Sections 3, I characterize the equilibrium occupational choices in a small, price-taking country with imperfect labor contracts. Section 4 explores the links between relative prices, occupational choice, and income distribution. I also establish there the inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium and discuss 4 the policy implications of this. Trade patterns are the subject of Section 5, where I consider trade between two large countries that differ only in their distributions of talent. Specifically, I assume that talent is uniformly distributed with the same mean in each of two countries and show that the country with the greater spread of talent imports the good produced by teams. In Section 6, I discuss the relationship of this paper to some others in the literature. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
The economy has two sectors. In one sector, production is a collective enterprise.
A team of workers performs a set of indivisible tasks, with one worker needed for each task. The technology dictates the total number of tasks and thus the size of a production unit. Output generated by a team is F (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ), where n is the number of tasks and q i is the skill of the team member who performs task i.
The physical quantity of output may vary with the composition of a team or the quality of the product may be different for different teams, with F (·) measuring output in quality-adjusted units. In any event, there are no identifiable outputs of the individual contributors, only the joint product of the team. I will refer to this as the "automobile" industry.
In the other sector, individuals can work alone. This may mean that a worker can produce a finished good or service single-handedly, as when a particular investment adviser handles a client's account, or that an individual's contribution to a group effort can be identified separately, as when some person can take credit for the authorship of a particular piece of software. The important assumption is that each worker's output is measurable and verifiable, so that in principle he could operate on his own.
I call this the "software" sector. I also assume that F (·) is symmetric and set the number of tasks equal to two.
The qualitative properties of the model with two members per team are the same as those with larger teams, so there is no need to carry around the extra terms. As for symmetry, it seems obvious that, in fact, skill is more important for some tasks than for others, and that some individuals are especially well suited to perform certain jobs.
But the symmetry assumption allows me to focus on issues to do with imperfect contracting without confounding them with considerations of comparative advantage.
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In this model, a worker of given talents would be equally adept at performing all jobs in a world of perfect information. All of the predictions about occupational choice stem from the assumed informational asymmetries and the restrictions on feasible contracts.
Finally, I take F (q 1 , q 2 ) to be a non-decreasing, twice differentiable, and supermodular function of its two arguments, with an elasticity of substitution between talents that is everywhere less than or equal to one. 4 Supermodularity means that for any four workers, aggregate output is highest when the more able of the two work- 6 ers performing task 1 is teamed with the more able of the workers performing task 2, as compared to the alternative possible pairing (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 ).
Together with the symmetry of tasks, it implies that it is efficient to pair the two workers of highest ability and the two of lowest ability, for any conceivable foursome working in the automobile industry. With F (·) twice differentiable, the supermodularity assumption is equivalent to F 12 ≥ 0. Thus, it captures the idea that team members' talents are complementary in producing value. Further, the bound on the elasticity of substitution ensures that the complementarities are moderately strong.
When the elasticity of substitution is never greater than one, both tasks must be completed at a non-zero level of competence for output to be positive. This seems a reasonable restriction to place on what one might call 'team production.'
The labor force comprises a continuum of individuals. Each individual is endowed with enough time to perform one productive task, be it one of the tasks needed to produce an automobile or the solo task of writing software. The individuals have no other valuable uses for their time. It takes no time, however, to offer contracts, sell output, or pay wages. Therefore, the same individuals who serve as workers conceivably can own and operate firms. The owner of a firm must honor all employment contracts into which he enters. In return, the owner gains property rights to the firm's output. There is a continuum of firms in each industry, and all firm owners behave competitively in the (world) product market.
The distribution of talent is exogenous in the model. I denote by Φ(q) the fraction of the L individuals in the home country with ability less than or equal to q. The distribution has a median q med , a meanq, and a range from q min to q max . When there are two countries, Φ * (q) will be used to represent the cumulative distribution function in the foreign country, and L * the labor force there. Often, I will take the distributions to be continuous and differentiable. Then φ(q) and φ * (q) will denote the derivatives, that is the p.d.f.'s for talent in each country.
I assume that all individuals in both countries have identical and homothetic preferences. These are represented by the utility function U (c a , c s ), where c i is con-sumption of good i, for i = a (automobiles) and s (software). I also assume for expositional simplicity that individuals are risk neutral, so that U (·) is homogeneous of degree one. Nothing of importance hinges on this assumption.
In the remainder of this section, I describe the equilibrium that would emerge in a world of perfect information. If individuals could readily observe one another's ability, then employers could link compensation to an employee's talent level. In such a setting, there would exist separate markets for workers of each ability and a different market clearing wage for each level of talent level. Such a setting admits a competitive, Walrasian equilibrium, the properties of which are well known.
In a Walrasian equilibrium, resource allocation maximizes the value of aggregate output given prices. The maximization of value in turn demands productive efficiency.
Here, efficiency requires positive assortative matching in the automobile industry.
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The equilibrium wages must be such as to make employers of automobile workers indifferent between the various teams they might assemble, but all teams will comprise two workers of identical ability. Of course, in equilibrium, there is free entry of employers, so firm owners earn zero profits.
Let f ≡ F (1, 1)/2. Then, since F (·) has constant returns to talent, 2fq is the potential output of automobiles by a pair of workers of talent q. The same two workers could instead produce 2λq units of software. With efficient matching, a worker's productivity is proportional to his talent, regardless of the sector of his employment.
This means that each country has a linear production possibility frontier with a slope of −f/λ.
In the Walrasian equilibrium, the allocation of talent is indeterminate. So too is the ownership of firms. The market clearing contracts pay wages that are proportional to ability. A worker of ability q can earn λpq by taking a job in the software industry and fq for one in the automobile industry, where p is the relative price of software in terms of autos. As in any Ricardian setting, the equilibrium price must be p = f/λ for positive output of both goods. Then each worker is indifferent as to his sector of employment. Automobile firms may be owned by one of the team members, who pays fq to his partner. Or the firm may be owned by a third party, who pays fq to each member of the team. In either case, profits are nil. Of course, market forces do determine the aggregate allocation of talent to each sector, which must be such that product markets clear.
What about international trade? With perfect information, the model gives rise to a Ricardian trade equilibrium for countries that share identical technologies. Each country has a production possibility frontier with slope −f/λ and the same relative demands for the two goods. Consequently, the benchmark equilibrium has no trade.
Imperfect Labor Contracts
Now suppose that an individual's ability is not observable and that a team's output cannot be verified. For example, it may be difficult for a court to assess the quality of an automobile or to ascertain which cars were produced by a given team. Then contracts linking pay to productivity would be impossible to enforce. 6 Potential employers have no choice but to offer contracts with fixed wages. These contracts are imperfect here, because they cannot be used to generate the efficient matches in the automobile industry. In this section, I characterize the general equilibrium for a small country that takes world prices as given.
It is necessary first to specify the details of how the labor market with imperfect contracting operates. I model this market as a two-stage, industry-choice-cum-auction game. In the first stage, each individual makes an irrevocable choice of industry. Let L s denote the measure of individuals that elect to produce software; I take some lit-
enter a hiring hall, where teams for producing automobiles are formed. In the hiring hall, each individual submits a bid for a partner. Bids take the form of unconditional wage offers. The highest fifty percent of the bids are designated as "winners," the rest as "losers." A winning bidder becomes a firm owner; i.e., he becomes a residual claimant with property rights to the output of his team. Each such firm owner is committed to pay his partner the amount of his bid. With some abuse of terminology, I will refer to the winning bidders as the "managers" of the firms. The losing bidders are assigned randomly to firms. These employees, or "workers," earn a fixed wage for their efforts. equilibrium wage rate w results, the option to become a worker affords any individual the opportunity to earn a fixed income that is independent of his talent level. 7 Notice that the owner of each firm is a member of the production team. I have specified the auction process so that this must be true, but there are also good economic reasons for it. If a third-party owner were to bid for two employees, such an individual would not know the ability of either one. Such a potential owner would face an informational disadvantage relative to the workerowners, who at least know their own ability. It will turn out that, at the prevailing equilibrium wage, any third-party owner of an automobile firm who might contemplate submitting a (winning)
bid for a pair of employees would face an expected shortfall of revenues relative to costs. Thus, the model provides an endogenous motive for "inside ownership," with some team members becoming residual claimants and others serving as their employees. The curve MM shows the expected income available to one who enters the automobile industry with the intention of becoming a manager. Such a manager faces uncertain prospects, because he commits to pay a fixed wage while his gross earnings depend on the identity of the partner with whom he is matched. But for any pool of potential employees, a prospective manager can compute the expected output of a team on which he might participate. Expected income is just the difference between expected output and the promised wage. The expected income of an individual qua manager is an increasing function of ability, because managers themselves perform one of the tasks required for joint production. Potential income decreases with w, because the manager must pay this amount to his prospective employee. Finally, the expected income of a manager reflects all of the occupational choices, inasmuch as these choices determine the composition of the labor pool from which the manager draws his partner.
Finally, the curve EE depicts the income opportunity for one who elects to become an entrepreneur. An entrepreneur produces a quantity of software in direct proportion to his talent level. Therefore, the potential income from this occupation is a linear function of ability, and reflects as well the world relative price p of software.
In the figure, I have depicted the MM curve as a concave function of an individual's ability. This must be true for all possible combinations of occupational choices, because for any given pool of potential workers, the expected output of a manager and his randomly assigned partner is a concave function of the manager's own talent level. I have also drawn the MM curve as passing above the (unique) intersection of the W W and EE curves. I will later argue (mostly in Appendix A) that this must be true in any equilibrium in which both goods are produced. It follows that there is a similar sorting of talent in any equilibrium with incomplete specialization. In such an equilibrium, individuals with talent below some cut-off level q w opt to become workers and earn a fixed wage. Those with talent levels between q w and q m choose to be managers in the automobile sector. And the most able individuals -those with talent levels above q m -produce software, where their personal productivity is fully reflected in their earnings.
When talent is sorted in the manner described, an individual with ability q w must be indifferent in equilibrium between becoming a worker and becoming a manager.
As a worker, he would earn a wage w. As a manager, he would draw a random partner from among all those in the pool of employees; i.e., those with a talent level less than or equal to his own. Each manager pays his employee a wage w. Therefore, an individual with talent q w is indifferent between the two occupations if and only if
Similarly, an individual with talent q m must face similar earnings prospects as a manager and as an entrepreneur. In the former occupation, he draws from the same pool of potential partners as do other managers. As an entrepreneur, he stands to earn λpq m from his potential output of λq m units of software. Thus, in an equilibrium with incomplete specialization, it must be that
Finally, the number of workers in the automobile sector must match the number of managers, since each team comprises one worker and one manager. The number of workers is Φ(q w ) when all those with talent levels between q min and q w select this occupation. The number of managers is Φ(q m ) − Φ(q w ) when those with abilities between q w and q m opt for management positions. Thus,
in any equilibrium.
Equations (1), (2) and (3) are three equations for the variables q w , q m , and w, parameterized by p. When they have a solution with q max > q m > q w > q min and w ≥ 0, they describe an equilibrium in a small economy that faces the relative price p. winner, and the set of losers would not change), while a lower bid would drop him from the winning set. Since the designated winning bidders have talent at least as great as the suspected median in the group, each strictly prefers to hire another at the specified wage than to be hired himself. As for the losing bidders, they cannot 13 benefit by bidding more (since they have bid their reservation wages), nor do they have any reason to bid less.
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To ensure that a solution to equations (1) - (3), when it exists, characterizes an equilibrium for the small open economy, we need to verify that each individual (weakly) prefers his designated occupation to every alternative. Clearly, this is so when the W W , MM, and EE curves are aligned as in Figure 1 . So, what we need to check is that the MM curve passes above the intersection of the W W curve and the A solution to (1) -(3) with q max > q m > q w > q min and w ≥ 0 exists if and only if 8 Notice that no third party would wish to hire a pair of workers for the amount of the winning bids, because the expected productivity of two random hires from among a worker pool comprising the least talented L a /2 workers is less than twice the wage that would leave the median in the group indifferent between serving as a worker or as a manager.
p falls between p a and p s , where
and
and q med is the median talent level in the labor force. Thus, p a and p s are the limits on the relative price of software that allow for an equilibrium with incomplete specialization. When p < p a , the most talented individual in the labor force earns more by hiring a random partner from among those in the bottom half of the talent distribution than he could by producing software. 10 Then the economy specializes in the production of automobiles. When p > p s , the least talented worker can earn more by producing software than he can earn by entering the automobile sector and matching with another whose talent is exactly like his own. 11 Then the economy specializes in producing software.
Finally, we observe that the solution to (1) - (3) need not be unique. That is, for a general distribution function Φ(q) and an arbitrary relative price p, there may be several (but always an odd number of) different allocations of talent with the property 9 The proof of this statement is in Appendix A. Note that p s > p a if and only if 
. Now, I(q med ) > 0 by the supermodularity of F, and
10 The expected output of a manager with abiltiy q max who hires randomly from among those in the bottom half of the talent distribution is 2 R q med qmin F (q max , q)dΦ(q). This provides the manager with a higher expected income in the autombile sector than the amount λpq max that he could earn as an entrepreneur, in view of p > p a and w = R q med qmin F (q med , q)dΦ(q). This value for w is implied by the condition of indifference for the marginal worker. 11 Two individuals of talent level q min who pair in the automobile sector as manager and worker will each earn fq min . This is less than λpq min when p > p s .
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that no individual has an incentive to make a different choice of occupation or bid differently in the hiring hall, given the anticipated behavior of others. For each such allocation there are corresponding outputs
and x s = λL R qmax qm qdΦ(q) that determine, together with aggregate demand, the pattern of world trade.
Consequences of International Trade
In the first part of this section, I study the consequences of international trade in a small country. I do so by examining the relationship between relative prices and the expected income of individuals at all levels in the talent distribution. In the second part of the section, I investigate the normative properties of the free-trade equilibrium.
I show that the equilibrium marginal rate of transformation between software and automobiles falls short of the world relative price of software. It follows that a small subsidy to automobile production would boost the value of national income at international prices even as it would improve the distribution of that income.
Exogenous changes in relative price
Consider the effects of an increase in p, as for example when the terms of trade improve in a country that exports software. Figure 2 proves useful for this purpose.
In this figure, the curve AA ("A" for automobile) depicts combinations of q m and w that satisfy (1) and (3) for a given price p between p a and p s . Along this curve, when all individuals with ability less than or equal to q m work in the automobile sector and the most talented half of them are managers, the individual with talent q w is just indifferent between being a worker and being a manager. The curve slopes upward, because the greater is the wage, the more tempting it is to be a worker, and only an individual of greater ability choosing from a more talented employment pool would be indifferent between the two roles. The curve SS ("S" for software) in turn depicts the combinations of w and q m that satisfy (2) and (3); i.e., they make the marginal managing an automobile plant and producing software before the price change will only be indifferent afterwards if the cost of hiring an employee in the automobile sector is lower than before. Thus, the SS curve shifts downward, as indicated by the dotted curves in the two panels of Figure 2 . Meanwhile, the price hike leaves the AA curve unaffected.
When the equilibrium is unique, an increase in the price of software causes q m to fall. This is clear in panel a, which depicts a falling SS curve, and it also applies to the case of a rising SS curve that cuts the AA curve once from below. 13 Intuitively, an increase in p draws individuals into the software sector by improving the prospects there for those who might otherwise operate automobile firms. As the top managers leave the automobile industry, some who were workers must now operate their own firms. That is, q w falls, and with it the average talent of those remaining in the employment pool. The wage rate is equal to one-half the expected output of the least-talented manager and his random partner (see (1)). Since both q w and the average ability of the partner fall, the wage falls as well. 14 Panel b of Figure 3 shows the effects of an increase in the price of software when there are multiple equilibria. Starting from any equilibrium at which the SS curve 13 If the curves cross only once, the SS curve must be flatter than the AA curve at the point of intersection, by the argument of the previous footnote.
14 Note that the decline in the wage benefits all managers of automobile firms equally, whereas the degredation of the talent pool hurts most the managers with the greatest talent. Therefore, it is the least talented of the original managers, if any, who stand to benefit from the net effect of the two. 
Inefficiency of the free-trade equilibrium
I will now argue that a subsidy to automobile producers would expand the size of the economic pie even as it redistributes income from those who earn the most to those who earn the least. 15 In other words, the size of the software sector in the freetrade equilibrium is larger than that which maximizes the value of national output at international prices.
The argument is straightforward. At the free-trade equilibrium, the least talented software writer produces output worth λpq m . If he were to choose instead to enter the automobile industry, his marginal contribution to national income would be π(q m ) + Ω/2Φ(q w ), where π(q m ) is the expected income of a manager of talent q m , and
But π(q m ) = λpq m , since the marginal manager must be indifferent between the two industries when occupational choices are made to maximize personal income.
National income would be augmented by shifting the marginal software writer to the 15 In making this statement, I neglect the possibility that the initial equilibrium is one at which the AA curve cuts the SS curve from below.
The marginal contribution to national income is (dx a /dq m )/φ(q m ), which can be calculated directly using dq w /dq m = φ(q m )/2φ(q w ).
automobile industry if and only if Ω > 0. In fact, Ω must be positive, because the term in brackets is the difference in expected output when a manager of talent z teams with the most talented worker compared to when he teams with a randomly selected worker.
I conclude that, when labor contracts are imperfect, private and social incentives diverge. When a talented individual enters into team production, he generates a positive externality. This is because his presence in the industry improves the talent pool there, which raises the average productivity in firms other than his own. In contrast, a talented individual appropriates all of the social benefits when he elects to work alone. A government could subsidize the sector in which an individual's productivity cannot be measured to encourage entry there. Not only would the poorest members of society benefit, but the increase in income would exceed the cost of the (small) subsidy.
Talent Distribution and the Pattern of Trade
In the last section, I established some properties of a trade equilibrium in a small country with imperfect labor contracts. This section examines the pattern of trade between two large countries. More specifically, I link the trade pattern to differences in the distribution of talent. Once that is done, I will be able to discuss how trade affects income distribution differently in relatively homogeneous versus relatively heterogeneous societies.
I consider the special case in which each country has a uniform distribution of talent and the mean skill level is the same in both two countries. In the foreign country, the range of talents is fromq − e * toq + e * . In the home country, talents run fromq − e toq + e, with e > e * . Thus, the home country has a more diverse labor force than the foreign country, and a greater fraction of individuals with very low ability. We will see how this leads the home country to export software.
In a free-trade equilibrium, the countries face the same relative world price. We can ascertain the trade pattern by examining how the relative supplies of the two A spread in the distribution of talent shifts both curves downward. The new locations are indicated by the dotted lines. The shift in the AA curve can be understood as follows. For a given value of q m , an increase in e reduces q w . If q m were unchanged, the new least-talented manager would be less productive than before, and, moreover, he would draw from a less talented pool of workers. For this individual to be attracted into management, the wage would need to be lower than before. As for the SS curve, 23 the reasoning is similar. For an individual with talent q m , expected revenues in the automobile sector decline with an increase in e, because the average ability of the prospective partner is lower. The individual who was initially the marginal manager can be indifferent between the two industries only if the wage rate also is lower.
The algebra reveals that the SS curve shifts down by more.
17 Thus, an increase in the uniform spread of talent at a given price causes some individuals who would have worked in the team sector to opt instead for production where their productivity can be measured. The downward shift in q m occurs because the fall in the average ability of a prospective hire outweighs the decline in the wage. This reflects the assumed complementarities in team production. Since the least-talented manager is relatively close in ability to his expected partner, the downward pressure on the wage caused by the dilution of the worker pool is modest compared to the loss of productivity for the most-talented manager, for whom the reduction in a partner's talent is especially damaging.
It can be shown, in fact, that dq m /de < −1; i.e., the range of individuals who choose the automobile sector contracts, even as the number of persons with any given talent level falls. Thus, there are fewer individuals in the automobile sector after the mean-preserving spread, and the average ability of both workers and managers is diminished. This implies that a uniform spread in talent reduces output of automobiles at a given price.
In the software sector, the number of writers expands, but average ability falls.
Output would remain the same if dq m /de were equal to minus one. Then the number of software writers would be unchanged, and the average ability would be the same as well. Since dq m /de < −1, the sector is even larger than the size that would keep output constant. Although the extra software writers are less productive than the others in the industry, they still produce positive output. Therefore, a spread in the talent distribution increases aggregate software production.
To summarize, the larger pool of very low skilled workers in the country with the 17 All of the algebra is relegated to Appendix B.
greater spread of talents generates a greater disincentive for a talented individual to enter into team production. Such an individual would anticipate being paired with a less able partner in the country with the fatter bottom tail in the talent distribution.
Although the wage he would pay his partner would be lower in this country as well, the loss in expected productivity would outweigh the cost savings. We find that the country with the greater diversity of talents produces relatively fewer automobiles, and of course relatively more software. With identical and homothetic preferences, this country imports automobiles and exports software in a free-trade equilibrium.
What are the effects of the trade induced by imperfect labor contracting? Compared to autarky, the relative price of software is higher in the country that exports software. We have seen that a rise in p raises the income of the most talented (and richest) individuals, while reducing the wage for those with the least ability. Thus, trade contributes to a further polarization of society in a country that has a relatively diverse labor force. Just the opposite is true in the relatively homogeneous society; the range of incomes was relatively narrow to begin with, and trade narrows this range even further. Finally, note that trade exacerbates the informational externality in the country with a greater spread of talents, whereas it alleviates this externality in its trade partner.
6 Related Literature The issues to do with adverse selection in my analysis call to mind some of the literature on efficiency wages. In particular, Weiss (1980 Weiss ( , 1991 and Malcomson (1981) present models in which firms that cannot observe workers' abilities offer "extra" wages in order to make their jobs appealing to a wider range of talents.
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The focus of these papers is on the unemployment that could result when all firms attempt to pay above-market wages in order to improve their applicant pool. Here, I have intentionally adopted an institutional setting in which efficiency wages are impossible. First, I have assumed ex post immobility across sectors, which means that the population of workers in the automobile industry is fixed at the time that contracts are tendered. Second, I have modeled the labor market as a multi-winner auction, which precludes talented managers from offering high wages and thereby attracting applications from individuals who would otherwise serve as managers themselves. My intent here was to focus on the allocation of talent in a simple model with imperfect contracts, not to study the determinants of unemployment. Since perfect matching could never result even if firms were to offer efficiency wages, it seemed best to abstract from the complications that such offers introduce.
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My analysis of the trade equilibrium bears a family resemblance to that in Clemenz He also concludes, like me, that the equilibrium allocation of talent is inefficient, and that trade can bring harm to one of the countries by causing its sector with unobservable productivity to contract.
This paper also relates to previous research on the matching of workers in firms.
In particular, Kremer (1993) and Legros and Newman (1997) have studied the sorting generated by a competitive labor market when the production process requires that several individuals interact and the tasks performed by each are complementary in producing output. Kremer and Maskin (1996) document the growing segregation of American workers by skill and the absolute decline in wages of low-skill workers.
They use a model with complementarities between asymmetric tasks to explain these 19 In a setting in which talented managers can offer high wages to attract a more talented pool of applicants, there would still be no way to prevent the less talented from applying for the high-wage jobs. Thus, perfect matching of individuals of like ability in the automobile industry could not be an equilibrium outcome.
observations, which they ascribe ultimately to an increase in both the mean and the dispersion of talents in the U.S. labor force. My results suggest that growing trade with countries that have more homogeneous populations than the United States can account for many of the same observations.
Like in this paper, Grossman and Maggi (2000) draw a link between the diversity of talent in a country's labor force and the pattern of its international trade.
But they emphasize technological differences in the interaction between workers in different sectors. In some industries, different productive activities may be complementary, as suggested by Kremer (1993 
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Appendix A
In this appendix I prove that, for p ∈ (p a , p s ), there exists an equilibrium with incomplete specialization in which every individual in the software sector has greater ability than the most able manager in the automobile industry. I also prove that there does not exist any equilibrium in which some individuals in the software industy have less ability than that of the most able manager.
For p > p a , the SS curve of Figure 2 lies above the AA curve at q m = q min . For p < p s , the AA curve lies above the SS curve at q m = q max . Both curves are continuous. Therefore, when p ∈ (p a , p s ), the curves must intersect at least once for some q m between q min and q max . At this intersection, equations Suppose not. Then, for the values of w, q w , and q m that satisfy (1) -(3), the configuration of the W W , MM, and EE curves must be as depicted in Figure 5 . Defineq such that λpq = w. Notice that q < q w , which, with (1), impliesF (q w )/2q w < λp. Notice too that the slope of the MM curve at q w exceeds its slope at the (first) intersection with EE, which in turn exceeds the slope of EE. Thus,
Since F (·) is symmetric and has an elasticity of substitution less than one, q w F 1 (q w , q)/F (q w , q) ≤ 1/2 for all q ≤ q w . Therefore
which is a contradition. It follows that, for p ∈ (p a , p s ), there exists a solution to (1)-(3) with w > 0 and
Now suppose that there exists an equilibrium with incomplete specialization in which some individuals in the software industry have less ability than that of the most able manager. In such an equilibrium, the allocation of labor must be as shown in Figure 6 . The least talented individuals with q <q = w/λp are workers in the automobile industry. Those with q ∈ (q, q a ) work in the software industry, while those with abilities q ∈ (q a , q b ) are managers of automobile firms. Also, the MM curve is steeper at q w than it is at q a , and it is steeper at q a than is the EE curve.
Therefore,F 0 (q w ) > λp.
But q w >q impliesF (q w )/2q w < λp, by the definitions of q w andq. Also, the symmetry of F (·) and the fact that it has an elasticity of substitution everywhere less than one implies q w F 1 (q w , q)/F (q w , q) ≤ 1/2 for all q ≤ q w . This in turn implieŝ Again, we have a contradiction. So there can be no equilibrium of the sort depicted in Figure 6 .
Appendix B
This appendix derives the comparative statics of the model under the assumption of a uniform distribution of talents. In the process, I substantiate the various claims made in the text.
Let q ∼ U [q min , q max ], where q min =q − e, q max =q + e, andq is the mean of q. Combining (1) and (2), and using the properties of the uniform distribution, we have
With q uniformly distributed, (3) becomes q m = 2q w − q min .
Differentiating (A1) and (A2) totally with respect to p gives dq m dp Now, ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , and ∆ 5 are negative by the supermodularity of F (·), ∆ 3 is negative because q w ≥ q for all q ∈ [q min , q w ], and ∆ 4 is negative because F 12 (q w , q) > 0 and F (·) homogeneous of degree one implies F 22 (q w , q) < 0 for q ∈ [q min , q w ]. Thus, ∆ < 0.
With ∆ < 0, (A3) implies dq m /dp < 0. But the output of software is inversely related to q m ;
R qmax qm qdq. Therefore, dx s /dp > 0.
Also, dq w /dp = (dq m /dp)/2. Therefore, dq w /dp < 0. From (1) and the properties of the uniform distribution, we have w =F (q w ) 2 .
Then ∂w/∂q w > 0, which means that dw/dp < 0. 
Note that −2/∆ > 0, while ∆ < 0 and q m > q w , which implies that the term in curly brackets in (A5) is negative. Therefore, dq m /de + 1 < 0 and, a fortiori, dq m /de < 0. Note from (A2) and q m =q − e that dq w de = 1 2
With dq m /de < −1, this implies dq m /de < dq w /de < −1.
The term on the first line on the right-hand side of (A6) is negative, because q w > q min . The term on the second line of (A6) is negative, because F (z, q w ) > F(z, q min ) and dq w /de < −1. The term on the third line of (A6) is negative, becauseF (q m ) >F (q w ) and dq m /de < dq w /de < 0. I conclude that dx a /de < 0; i.e., a spread in the distribution of talent reduces equilibrium output of automobiles.
Since dx s /de > 0 and dx a /de < 0, d(x s /x a )/de > 0. That is, a spread in the distribution of talent increases relative output of software at a given price. It follows that a country with a more diverse labor force produces relatively more software in a free-trade equilibrium. With identical and homothetic preferences, this country must export software and import automobiles.
